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Introduction 
The nature of risk management and the challenges generated by its theory and 
practice have been in a state of evolution over the past 10 years. This process of 
evolution has created a number of difficulties for those involved in the management 
of risk, who now increasingly find themselves lacking the necessary capabilities to 
cope with the nature of this change – not least because of the increased volume of 
information around the various sources of threat and the trans-disciplinary nature of 
the problems. The dynamic nature of emergent hazards requires new techniques and 
analytical frameworks for dealing with low probability – high consequence events 
(sometimes termed as ‘black swans’) (Taleb, 2007) that are contextualized within a 
highly connected system. The oft quoted ‘post-modern’ nature of risk also generates a 
set of task demands around our understanding of public perceptions, media 
‘amplification’ and the distortion of risks (in both probabilistic and consequential 
terms), along with their subsequent impacts upon policy making. Policy makers and 
practitioners, when turning to the academic world for insights, solutions or at least the 
important challenges to the dominant worldview, may now be finding the academic 
field somewhat ‘wanting’ in this regard. This is because of a number of reasons but 
may chiefly be because of the multi-disciplinary nature of the problems generated by 
the risk and the difficulties that many universities have in structuring and supporting 
research beyond conventional departmental boundaries. In this editorial, we attempt to 
set out what we consider to be the characteristics of some of the shifts in the nature of 
risk, and in doing so, hope to initiate an agenda for debate and development that we 
consider to be of significance to the authors and readers of Risk Management. 
Risks such as the ‘new’ forms of terrorism, pandemic flu and the recent economic 
collapse within the financial sector, along with the consequential global economic 
crisis, serve to illustrate the borderless nature of risk in a renewed, but in several 
respects, significantly different manner. Moreover, they present several challenges to 
conventional approaches to risk management: (1) they often lack the a priori evidence 
that would render them predictable to any degree; (2) they are sufficiently large, in 
terms of the damage that they cause, to trigger further hazards or crises further down 
the timeline and (3) their origin, evolution and final scale and form are frequently 
unknown, such that they represent an emerging, ill-understood and ill-defined set of 
risks that need to be dealt with. As a result, they often require mediation by technical 
experts in an attempt to provide an evaluation of the likely failure modes and effects. 
As a consequence, and on the basis of these characteristics alone, many emergent 
forms of risk often do not yield to conventional forms of risk assessment and 
management or indeed to conventional policies at an institutional or Governmental 
level. These new forms of risk also illustrate the interconnected nature of ‘risk’, 
‘crisis’ and ‘disaster’ and the manner in which discrete events can serve as triggers for 
other problems within an all too often nested system. In addition, the mitigation and 
response to risks in the broadest sense is increasingly a function of interagency and 
networked forms of management and organization. Although such approaches are 
essential for dealing with risk, they invariably represent a ‘double-edged sword’ as 
they can also be important factors in inhibiting or complicating risk communication 
and early warnings of failure. The question remains as to what role such networks 
play in allowing risk potential to contribute to the ‘incubation’ (Turner, 1976) of risk 
and what techniques are available to deal with this process. As governments, 
practitioners and academics increasingly engage in debate around the nature of these 
threats, along with their mitigation and future impact, then a particular note of caution 
needs to be given on how these events are understood, and the ways in which different 
communities of practice define, conceptualize and seek to address them. Of particular 
salience here is the growing use of, and importance attached to, the policy concept of 
resilience. 
The potential range of issues arising from these new forms of threat, and from the 
response of these various communities of practice, is beyond the scope of this 
editorial. Here, we seek to address three particular aspects of the challenges that face 
academics and practitioners associated with risk management, and to set out some 
directions in which we hope that debates might develop. The first of these is the 
particular difficulties that arise from the ways in which risk transcends the natural and 
artificial borders that surround institutions, nations, cultures and bodies of knowledge. 
The second is the way in which we understand the notion of resilience in terms of 
both theory and practice. The third relates to the spatial interactions that take place 
within a networked society to generate what we term ‘spaces of vulnerability’ and, 
ultimately, ‘spaces of destruction’ (Smith, 2009). 
 
Risks without Borders 
The notion of a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992) and the ‘management’ of risk, across a 
number of dimensions, have assumed positions of considerable importance within 
several bodies of academic literature (Perrow, 1984; Shrivastava, 1987; Giddens, 
1990; Hewitt, 1997; Reason, 1997; McGuire, 1999; Smith, 2001). What is clear from 
this burgeoning body of research is that risk transcends a number of academic 
disciplines and also cuts across other boundaries – whether they are sociotechnical, 
geopolitical, organizational, cultural, physical or health related. In many cases, the 
borders or boundaries between these issues are permeable and the effects and 
consequences of particular hazards can migrate across these borders. At the same 
time, risks are mitigated and controlled by organizations that seek to work together 
through communities of practice and thereby seek to transcend their own 
organizational and professional constraints. Thus, a complex mosaic emerges in 
which the causal factors, mechanisms of transmission and escalation, and the range of 
processes around mitigation, and control cut across disciplinary and structural 
boundaries. 
Risk is, therefore, and perhaps always has been, a borderless phenomenon and, yet 
despite this, there has been insufficient academic attention focused on the issues that 
surround the management of those risks across the various ‘borders’ that exist. In 
part, this is because of the silo mentality that often exists within organizations and 
which is exacerbated by strict disciplinary boundaries within academia. In practical 
terms, the interplay between elements of ‘risk’ at the various intersects generates 
some interesting issues for ‘organizations’ to deal with. It is almost axiomatic that 
there are problems that are generated across a range of tangible and intangible 
borders. However, there are also some important lessons for organizations and policy 
makers that take place at this very nexus. The interplay between disciplinary 
perspectives on risk can generate new understandings that may have a relevance to 
various types of hazards along with their prevention and ‘management’. The year 
2008 provided several examples of the pervasive and trans-boundary nature of risk 
within modern societies. 
 
Emergent Forms of Risk 
The failure of the sub-prime market in the United States and its effects on European 
banks and beyond, provides a stark reminder of the interconnected nature of business 
and the manner in which failures can cascade through the ‘system’ (Altman, 2009). 
This particular failure cascade was both swift and, for many organizations, 
catastrophic. The ‘failure’ of established and reputed financial institutions and 
businesses, and the need for others to be rescued by their respective national 
governments provided a clear indication of the vulnerability of connected 
organizations to shock events within the globalized business ‘environment’. Although 
financial connectivity and risk is an obvious and highly visible aspect of modern 
organizational forms, there are also other more physical manifestations of the 
interconnected mosaic of hazards that bind organizations together. 
The continued threat of pandemic flu has remained an issue on the policy agenda 
(Lim et al, 2007; Zarocostas, 2008) and has been highlighted by continued coverage 
in the popular press – notably around the emergence of the so-called ‘Australian flu’ 
and the outbreak of seasonal flu in late 2008. The risks associated with the potential 
for a pandemic outbreak of flu from the H5N1 strain remain an issue of concern to 
health professionals and one that is constantly monitored by health surveillance 
systems globally, although there are concerns about the potentially fragmented nature 
of regulatory coverage and the scale of the problem (Karesh and Cook, 2005). Against 
this background threat (Osterholm, 2005, 2007), the extent of media coverage, and the 
potential for the media amplification of risk potential, remains an issue for 
organizations to deal with as part of their wider crisis management strategies. The risk 
of pandemic flu, although terrible in terms of its potential consequences, should also 
be set against the background of other forms of disease outbreaks and public health 
issues (Karesh and Cook, 2005). Within Western nations, we enjoy greater prosperity 
and health than in earlier generations and despite the concerns that dominate the 
popular press, we are probably safer as a society than at any time in our history. What 
has changed is the manner in which risks are generated, escalate and are transmitted 
across organizational and other ‘boundaries’. Our interconnected societies help to 
ensure that the spread of transmission of certain forms of disease is faster than for 
previous generations. There is also the problem of new, and as yet unidentified, 
zoonotic infections: diseases capable of crossing the animal–human boundary. Given 
some estimates suggest that over 850 infectious diseases are capable of such 
transmission, then the problems of dealing with these multi-host pathogens is self-
evident: When a pathogen can find refuge or a place to mutate in a range of hosts, 
controlling it becomes far more complex, requiring an integrated – and much more 
difficult – approach. (Karesh and Cook, 2005, p. 41) 
The close proximity of people to livestock in certain parts of the world, the density of 
population and the ease with which people travel, all combine to create a ‘tightly 
coupled and interactively complex’ (Perrow, 1984) system in which disease can both 
mutate and can be transmitted quickly from animals to humans. 
A third form of ‘new, borderless risk’ comes from terrorist activity. The attacks on 
Mumbai in 2008 highlighted the vulnerabilities that exist within modern societies, and 
port cities in particular, from the risks associated with international terrorism and the 
difficulties that government agencies face in protecting populations and other 
potential targets from attack. The constantly evolving but largely unpredictable nature 
of the terrorist threat continually seeks to expose the vulnerabilities that exist within 
organizations and government agencies and is likely to do so for some time to come. 
Although the media focus attention on the immediate violent acts and destruction 
perpetrated by the terrorists, there is an established view that the strategy of terrorism 
has a long-term goal for which the violence is simply the beginning (Fromkin, 1974–
1975): Terrorism, as has been seen, is the weapon of those who are prepared to use 
violence but who believe that they would lose any contest of sheer strength. All too 
little understood, the uniqueness of the strategy lies in this: that it achieves its goal not 
through its acts but through the response to its acts. In any other strategy, the violence 
is the beginning and its consequences are the end of it. For terrorism, however, the 
consequences of the violence are themselves merely a first step and form a stepping 
stone toward objectives that are more remote. (Fromkin, 1974–1975, pp. 962–963) 
In this context, many terrorist acts can be seen as the trigger events for a wider set of 
consequences and the exposure of further vulnerabilities within the system. 
Accordingly, there have been suggestions that the attacks of September 11th 
represented a means to an end rather than an end in itself (Doran, 2002). Returning to 
Mumbai, it could be argued that this attack can be seen as part of a wider strategy – 
with the ultimate goal of the terrorists yet to be revealed. Some commentators have 
offered potential interpretations of that ultimate goal and Schindler (2008), for 
example, makes the comparison between the events at Sarejevo in 1914 and the 
attacks in Mumbai in 2008. His argument is that, like Sarejevo in 1914, the roots of 
potential further conflict already existed between India and Pakistan and the Mumbai 
attacks simply exposed the embedded vulnerability and tensions between the two 
nations. Schindler sets out a description of events for Sarajevo that could equally 
apply to the attacks on Mumbai: A bold terrorist attack on a peaceful city strikes fear, 
then horror among bystanders, then an entire nation. Gunmen barely out of their teens, 
sent on a clandestine one-way mission against a hated foe, create a bloody 
international incident with huge implications. Two neighboring states, long at 
loggerheads over issues of borders and identity, lurch towards war as a nervous world 
watches. (John R. Schindler, US Naval War College, 2008)1 
The attacks on Mumbai have, to-date, failed to fully ignite the tensions that exist 
between India and Pakistan, does not detract from the potential for risk that exists 
within the region. It also raises questions about the long-term strategic goal of terrorist 
groups, who are actively targeting countries where there is an existing high level of 
tension and especially where the main protagonists have nuclear capability. If 
Fromkin is correct, then the stepping-stones that form part of the terrorist strategy 
may well lead to an end point that has frightening consequences. 
Each of these examples given above illustrates the trans-boundary nature of risk and 
the potential that they have to ‘cascade’ through time and space. They also have the 
potential to by-pass organizational controls, thereby leading to an escalation of their 
consequences. They are trans-boundary because, at their simplest, they transcend 
national, political and social boundaries. For example, the migration of risk potential 
through a range of networks has become an issue of concern for managers, as risks 
within elements of company supply chains have implications for the management of 
risk. The disruption of those supply chains, and the underlying critical national 
infrastructures they support are particular threats that exercise the minds of 
government and those responsible for the elements of, and links between these 
essential network nodes (Flynn, 2002, 2004; Luft and Korin, 2004; Boin and Smith, 
2006). Protecting these networks and infrastructures when they are so extensive, 
generates an interesting set of problems as the tension between Russia and the 
Ukraine (and its consequences for gas supplies in Europe) has illustrated. There also 
seems to be a risk of conflict between energy-rich states, a phenomenon that may well 
increase as resources deplete further and the demand for energy increases (Ross, 
2008). 
The risks we have explored are also trans-boundary because they do not have a single-
root cause for the nature of the threat and also involve multiple causal agents and 
pathways for transmission. As such, they do not ‘fit’ neatly into the conceptual mind-
sets that we often have for categorizing threats and the causes of risk. They can also 
emerge as potential crises that evolve and develop at different speeds and over 
different time frames. Thus, from an organizational point of view, a particularly 
vexing question is how do we create organizations that are resilient to the escalation 
of ‘normal’ perturbations within the system, where those perturbations have the 
potential to shift the equilibrium of system to the point that they become major ‘risk’ 
or crisis events (Smith, 2009)? 
The examples listed above also raise some interesting issues for the management of 
risk and the development of ‘resilience’ within organizations. ‘Resilience’, for 
example, has become the politically accepted term of choice to describe the processes 
around crisis management and business continuity. The nature of resilience, as an 
operational construct, is an important element in the ability of nation states and 
organizations (especially those that transcend national borders) to cope with the task 
demands of those risk events that have been called ‘a new species of trouble’ 
(Erikson, 1994). The ways in which resilience is understood and operationalized, and 
the development of risk management strategies in light of these perspectives and 
approaches should arguably form the basis of an increasing level of enquiry and 
debate within this journal. As noted earlier, now we go on to set out two dimensions 
of these issues below, as a means of stimulating thinking and future work around this 
aspect of risk management. 
 Resilience and Risk 
Resilience as a concept seems to have a strong relationship with the notion of stability 
– a resilient organism or organization is one that remains stable (or close to stable) in 
the face of perturbations or is able to return to the equilibrium point quickly after a 
perturbation impacts upon it. There are, however, some debates as to what the nature 
of that equilibrium means – does it imply that the ‘system’ has to return to the same 
point where it was before the perturbation or does it move to a new state of stability? 
There are also debates as to whether there can be multiple points of equilibrium 
within a system at a particular point in space and time. Although these might seem to 
be interesting academic debates, they also have implications for the design of resilient 
systems in practice and certainly have relevance to the relationship between 
hazardous consequences and system's stability. 
As a concept, resilience can be seen as having both spatial and temporal dimensions – 
organizations and organisms are resilient to certain things, at particular points in time 
and within particular contexts (Carpenter et al, 2001). It is not, and cannot be, an all-
encompassing process that provides ongoing protection to all threats or one that 
simply allows stability to be maintained in a changing environment. Although this 
might seem to be something of a moot point, it is important to recognize at the outset 
that the concept has its limitations and is not the panacea that some would claim for 
the problems that face governments and organizations. It is also important to note that 
different literatures consider the term in quite different ways. Depending on the 
perspective chosen, a key element in our understanding of resilience might centre on 
the notion of multiple, as opposed to a singular, point(s) of equilibrium. Our opening 
examples in this paper would lend weight to the view that the maintenance of 
equilibrium is a multi-dimensional process and that there might be both multi-scale, 
and variable speed processes taking place within these wider system contexts. A 
system may, therefore, be stable at a particular point in time but may be unstable 
elsewhere within its operational ‘space’. Equally, over time, a system may appear to 
be stable (or in equilibrium) but may be characterized by frequent fluctuations that 
establish potential points of instability and that could in turn lead to the erosion of 
defenses. From a risk management perspective, this creates a series of challenges for 
managers in their attempts to ensure that effective controls are in place to prevent the 
escalation and migration of hazard potential; although, at the same time, living with 
perturbations, multiple points of equilibrium and disequilibrium. There is, therefore, a 
need to develop and enhance our understanding of the point at which to intervene and 
manage the system – to the extent that effective ‘management’ of a dynamic system is 
even possible at the level of control that some managers would want. 
There are some important differences in the interpretation of the concept of resilience 
depending on its disciplinary origins, which again need to be acknowledged by the 
range of academics, policy makers and practitioners using the term. Resilience has 
been seen as having its origins in two distinct bodies of literature (Holling and 
Gunderson, 2002). The first view of resilience draws upon work in engineering where 
resilience is seen as having a focus on: … stability near an equilibrium steady state, 
where resistance to disturbance and speed of return to the equilibrium are used to 
measure the property. (Holling and Gunderson, 2002, p. 27) 
As such, the focus is seen to be on the processes of … efficiency, control, constancy 
and predictability – all attributes at the core of desires for fail-safe design and optimal 
performance. Those desires are appropriate for systems where uncertainty is low. 
(Holling and Gunderson, 2002, p. 27) 
The appeal of the concept as defined within the engineering perspective is obvious. 
The notion of ‘bounce-back’ within the system is seen as an important attribute of the 
process of contingency planning as the system recovers to its pre-shock state. 
However, the notion of bounce-back does have its limitations in practice. 
Sociotechnical systems, for example, do not behave in the same way as ‘engineered’ 
systems. The introduction of agents (as operators, owners, users or even victims of the 
system) brings with it multiple opportunities for emergence. The ability of the system 
to bounce back is also often severely constrained in practice. Witness the response to 
the floods in Hull (in the United Kingdom) where 2 years after the initial flooding, 
families are still housed in temporary accommodation awaiting a return to their 
homes. In this case, resilience – despite the best efforts of those responsible for the 
processes of recovery – seems to be somewhat problematic to achieve in practice. 
Insights into the problem can be obtained from the second body of work, which 
relates to research carried out in the field of systems biology and ecology where 
resilience is consider as: … conditions far from any equilibrium steady state, where 
instabilities can flip a system into another regime of behaviour – i.e. to another 
stability domain. (Holling and Gunderson, 2002, p. 27) 
Here resilience can be seen in terms of the level of the systems ability to deal with 
high levels of uncertainty around the issues of … persistence, adaptiveness, 
variability, and unpredictability – all attributes embraced and celebrated by those with 
an evolutionary or developmental perspective. The latter attributes are at the heart of 
understanding and designing for sustainability. (Holling and Gunderson, 2002, p. 27) 
Thus, one might argue that there is an important relationship between sustainability 
and resilience if we use a more biologically-oriented approach to the term than if we 
adopt the engineering approach. It could also be argued that the engineering approach 
is more suited to those areas where the determination of risk is undertaken on a firm 
basis of the a priori evidence of earlier failures. However, for low probability, high 
consequence events or where there is a significant level of emergence, then this 
reliance on an engineering approach no longer provides a firm basis for analysis or for 
assessing threats that are seen to be of an ‘emergent’ nature. Returning to the 
examples that we set out at the start of this paper, then it is clear that many of the 
issues that we face within a risk management context are of such an emergent form 
and we, therefore, need to reconsider our approaches to the management of such 
phenomena. The manner in which we deal with ‘stability’ within organizations and 
the policy-making processes also need to come under scrutiny and be subjected to 
careful, systematic consideration if there has to be coherence in the approach taken by 
the wide-ranging number of organizations involved within the increasingly global, 
boundary-less domain of risk. 
 
 
Spaces of Vulnerability and Spaces of Destruction 
A related, and equally important aspect of the treatment of resilience, is the notion of 
vulnerability and the way in which we conceptualize that process operating within 
space and time. The ‘landscapes’ in which organizations operate are invariably 
fractured and pitted. There are ‘spaces of vulnerability’ that exist both within and 
between organizations and these have the potential to expose weaknesses in 
organizational controls and thus impact upon the limitations of strategies to develop 
resilience. Inevitably, gaps in defences emerge, weak signals and early warnings are 
ignored, and there is a high degree of likelihood that managerial assumptions and 
beliefs will lead to an erosion of organizational capabilities around control. There are 
considerable service design issues associated with this process. For example, there are 
new challenges to the way in which we design organizations to provide both a 
seamless service to ‘customers’ and to maintain a level of security that is effective, 
and minimally intrusive. The interaction between these, and other elements, will serve 
to create and sustain ‘spaces of destruction’ (Smith, 2009) in which the interplay 
between resilience and the search for equilibrium by organizations will create 
fractures within the defences, which organizations establish to ensure stability in the 
first place. Managers may then ultimately become the authors of their own misfortune 
as they seek to create rigid systems of control that maintain a particular point of 
equilibrium in situations where, in fact, the dynamics of the system mitigate against 
such rigid attempts at control. These controls may inhibit the required levels of 
adaptation to environmental changes and may, therefore, result in a shift in the very 
equilibrium that the controls were designed to protect in the first place. This raises a 
question on how organizations can develop the dynamic capabilities that are required 
to cope with such challenges – a challenge that also faces the academic and research 
communities in terms of the ways in which we train and educate managers. If the 
MBA, for example, is to provide the means of developing these capabilities, and 
become more than a composite of the functional areas of management, then it will 
need to ensure that it also evolves to meet the future needs of organizations around the 
creation and maintenance of these dynamic capabilities. It needs to encourage future 
generations of managers to reflect upon the lessons that emerge from the various 
crises facing organizations and give them the skills to learn from those mistakes and, 
perhaps more importantly, to reflect upon the limits of their own knowledge and 
thereby help to prevent future events. By failing to do so, we will simply be destined 
to repeat the problems of the past. 
 
Taking the Debates Forward 
As part of the reorientation of Risk Management: An International Journal, we hope 
to encourage discussion and debate around some of these issues and others that 
challenge conventional perspectives on risk management. We intend to retain as the 
core of Risk Management, papers that address traditional issues within risk 
management and crisis management and to encourage reviews of the ways in which 
these approaches are evolving and can be refined, refreshed and reinterpreted in light 
of contemporary challenges. In addition, we are also seeking to encourage the 
submission of a body of papers that will bring a perspective that moves beyond the 
narrow engineering framework of risk, and that reflect the inter-disciplinary, 
boundary-less and inter-connected nature of the processes around risk, crisis and 
disaster. In this regard, we would actively encourage research-based and empirically-
derived papers that illustrate these multiple perspectives and challenges. We hope that 
these papers can present challenges in relation to the existing debates and literatures 
so as to highlight the ways in which the study of risk management can and must 
continue to evolve. With that in mind, we would close this editorial by encouraging 
the journal's readership to bear in mind the revised range of topics on which we would 
encourage submissions. They are:  
• Identifying, measuring and managing risk, crises and disasters. 
• Exploring and explaining risk behaviours in both organizational and societal 
contexts. 
• Dealing with risks associated with environmental impact and change and the 
issues of sustainability and adaptation. 
• Examining the ways in which chronic and acute forms of impacts are dealt 
with in risk assessments and especially considering the problems associated 
with extreme events. 
• Developing debate around the protection and management of organizational 
reputation. 
• Examining the nature of resilience, especially around issues of risk and 
security in relation to critical national infrastructures and from catastrophic 
events. 
• Identifying and developing the dynamic capabilities needed to both prevent 
and manage risk and resilience within organizations. 
 
Notes 
1 Source: http://www.takimag.com/blogs/article/mumbai_2008_sarajevo_1914/, 
accessed 1247 on the 30th December 2008. 
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